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docs: add 2025 software supply chain compromises to catalog
Signed-off-by: Yannis Folias <[email protected]>
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‎community/catalog/compromises/2003/gentoo-rsync.md‎

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## References
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- https://archives.gentoo.org/gentoo-announce/message/7b0581416ddd91522c14513cb789f17a
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- [Gentoo Linux server compromised](https://www.zdnet.com/article/gentoo-linux-server-compromised/)

‎community/catalog/compromises/2025/changed-files.md‎

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<!-- cSpell:ignore exfiltrated GHSA mrrh -->
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# tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromise
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In March 2025, attackers compromised the popular GitHub Action
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`tj-actions/changed-files`, used by over 20,000 repositories to detect file
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changes in pull requests.
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The threat actor compromised a maintainer's credentials to manipulate Git tags,
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redirecting trusted version references to a malicious commit that executed code
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during CI/CD workflows.
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The injected code captured environment variables and exfiltrated secrets such as
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GitHub tokens and API credentials to an external server. This compromise
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propagated silently through automated pipelines, as many users relied on mutable
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version tags (e.g., v35, v36) instead of immutable commit SHAs, meaning their
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workflows automatically pulled and executed the malicious code.
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## Impact
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This compromise had multiple implications across the GitHub Actions ecosystem
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as thousands of repositories were possibly exposed through automate workflows,
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any CI/CD runner secrets, repository tokens or organization credentials were
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potentially at risk, and overall demonstrated how a single third-party action
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could become a high-impact attack vector within trusted build automation
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pipelines.
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## Type of Compromise
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This is an _Attack Chaining_ type of attack as the attacker combined multiple
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weak links in the software delivery process.
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## References
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- [GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-mrrh-fwg8-r2c3](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrrh-fwg8-r2c3/)
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- [Wiz.io – GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files Supply Chain Attack (CVE-2025-30066)](https://www.wiz.io/blog/github-action-tj-actions-changed-files-supply-chain-attack-cve-2025-30066)

‎community/catalog/compromises/2025/ghost-action.md‎

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# The GhostAction Github Workflow Injection
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In September 2025, GitGuardian discovered GhostAction campaign, a large-scale
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supply chain campaign in which attackers compromised 327 GitHub user accounts
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and injected malicious workflows into 817 repositories, stealing a total of 3,325
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secrets. The malicious workflows, often titled "Github Actions Security",
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were engineered to enumerate known secret names from legitimate workflow files
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(e.g. PyPI tokens, npm tokens, DockerHub, AWS keys) and exfiltrate them via HTTP
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POST to attacker-controlled endpoints.
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## Impact
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The GhostAction campaign compromised the trust and integrity of GitHub's
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publishing pipelines, exposing sensitive credentials from hundreds of
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open-source projects. The stolen secrets, including registry tokens and cloud
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provider keys, could enable attackers to publish malicious packages, access
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private infrastructure, or escalate to broader supply chain compromises across
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ecosystems like npm, PyPI, and DockerHub. This incident highlights how
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manipulating CI/CD workflows can undermine the integrity of the entire
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open-source distribution chain.
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## Type of Compromise
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This compromise falls under _Publishing Infrastructure_ category as the
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attackers were able to compromise the underlying automation layer used to build
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and publish software.
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## References
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- [The GhostAction Campaign: 3,325 Secrets Stolen Through Compromised GitHub Workflows](https://blog.gitguardian.com/ghostaction-campaign-3-325-secrets-stolen/)

‎community/catalog/compromises/2025/npm-ecosystem.md‎

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<!-- cSpell:ignore Shai Hulud Shai hulud -->
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# Widespread npm Ecosystem Supply Chain Attack
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The Widespread npm Supply Chain Attack, which began around September 8, 2025,
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was a multi-phased incident. The initial phase involved a phishing campaign that
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compromised maintainer accounts, leading to the injection of a
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cryptocurrency-stealing payload into dozens of popular packages (like chalk and
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debug). This was quickly followed by the discovery of the "Shai-Hulud" worm
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campaign, which used a self-propagating credential-stealing malware to
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compromise over 500 npm packages.
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## Impact
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This compromise affected hundreds of packages and potentially thousands of
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downstream applications that automatically pulled the malicious versions. The
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injected payloads allowed for credential theft, unauthorized command execution,
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and persistent access in CI/CD environments. The incident exposed the fragility
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of transitive dependency trust and underscored the urgency of enforcing 2FA for
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maintainers, signed package publishing, and dependency integrity verification
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across the npm ecosystem.
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## Type of Compromise
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The npm ecosystem is a _Malicious Maintainer_ type of attack as the attackers
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managed to gain control of npm maintainer accounts and used their privileges to
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push malicious versions of legitimate packages.
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## References
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- [Breakdown: Widespread npm Supply Chain Attack Puts Billions of Weekly Downloads at Risk](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/cloud-security/npm-supply-chain-attack/)
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- [Ongoing Supply Chain Attack Involving npm Packages](https://www.csa.gov.sg/alerts-and-advisories/alerts/al-2025-093)
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- [Shai-hulud supply chain attack spreads token-stealing malware on npm](https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/shai-hulud-worm-npm)
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- [npm Chalk and Debug Packages Hit in Software Supply Chain Attack](https://www.sonatype.com/blog/npm-chalk-and-debug-packages-hit-in-software-supply-chain-attack)
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- [Another npm Supply Chain Attack: The 'is' Package Compromise](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/another-npm-supply-chain-attack-the-is-package-compromise)

‎community/catalog/compromises/2025/nx-platform.md‎

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<!-- cSpell:ignore ngularity exfiltrated -->
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# The Nx s1ngularity Attack Leading to Credentials Leak
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On August 26, 2025, attackers released malicious versions of the nx and @nx/*
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npm packages (versions 20.9.0 through 21.8.0). The trojanized packages contained
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credential-harvesting malware that scanned each developer system for sensitive
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artifacts: GitHub tokens, npm keys, SSH private keys, environment variables,
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cryptocurrency wallet files, and AI tool configurations. The malware exfiltrated
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stolen credentials via double Base64 encoding and published them to over 1,400
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public GitHub repositories, each named in a "s1ngularity-repository-*" pattern
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with a single `results.b64` file containing encoded data.
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## Impact
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The Nx s1ngularity attack had an extensive impact across the open-source and
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enterprise ecosystem. In total, over 20,000 files were exfiltrated, affecting
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more than 1,700 users worldwide. The attackers leveraged stolen credentials to
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make at least 6,700 private GitHub repositories public, exposing sensitive
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source code, proprietary configurations, and credentials — some belonging to
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major organizations and high-profile projects. This extensive exposure
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underscored the cascading risk of software supply chain compromises, where a
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single poisoned package can rapidly undermine trust and security across
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thousands of interconnected development environments.
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## Type of Compromise
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This is an _Attack Chaining_ type of attack as it required multiple levels of
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compromise.
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## References
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- [Serious NX build compromise - what you need to know about the s1ngularity attack](https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/nx-build-s1ngularity-supply-chain-attack/54223/)
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- [The Nx "s1ngularity" Attack: Inside the Credential Leak](https://blog.gitguardian.com/the-nx-s1ngularity-attack-inside-the-credential-leak/)
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- [s1ngularity Nx Supply Chain Attack: AI-Driven Credential Theft & Mass Exposure](https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/s1ngularity-nx-supply-chain-attack-ai-driven-credential-theft-mass-exposure/)

‎community/catalog/compromises/2025/oracle-cloud.md‎

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<!-- cSpell:ignore Exfiltrated exfiltrated -->
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# Oracle Cloud SSO and Identity Infrastructure Compromise
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The Oracle Cloud data breach, publicly disclosed around March 21, 2025, involved
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a large-scale compromise of authentication and identity management systems. A
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threat actor operating under the alias "rose87168" announced on the black-hat
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forum BreachForums that they had exfiltrated a significant number of records
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from Oracle Cloud's federated Single Sign-On (SSO) login servers and Lightweight
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Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) systems.
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The attacker claimed the initial infiltration occurred around mid-February 2025,
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possibly exploiting a vulnerability in an older, unpatched component of the
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infrastructure, such as Oracle Fusion Middleware 11G or a critical flaw in
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Oracle Access Manager (potentially related to CVE-2021-35587). The compromise is
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generally believed to have affected legacy Gen 1 servers and not the primary
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Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI) Gen 2 environment.
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## Impact
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The impact was focused on the mass compromise of critical authentication data,
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significantly increasing security risks for numerous organizations. The 6
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million records stolen included sensitive credentials such as encrypted
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SSO/LDAP passwords, key files, and authentication tokens. This exposure created
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a high risk of unauthorized account takeover, corporate espionage, and lateral
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movement within affected customers' environments, particularly if the encrypted
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credentials could be cracked. Furthermore, the threat actor sought to monetize
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the breach through extortion, demanding fees from companies to remove their data
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from the leak. The incident led to CISA guidance on credential risk mitigation
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and resulted in class action lawsuits against Oracle for alleged failure to
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implement standard data security practices and timely disclosure.
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## Type of Compromise
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Even though this was not related to a software package, this is considered to be
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a _Publishing Infrastructure_ type of compromise as it originated from
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vulnerabilities within Oracle’s identity and authentication infrastructure, a
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critical part of its service publishing and access layer.
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## References
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- [CloudSEK – The Biggest Supply Chain Hack of 2025: 6M Records Exfiltrated from Oracle Cloud](https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/the-biggest-supply-chain-hack-of-2025-6m-records-for-sale-exfiltrated-from-oracle-cloud-affecting-over-140k-tenants)
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- [CVE-2021-35587 – Oracle Access Manager Remote Code Execution Vulnerability](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-35587)

‎community/catalog/compromises/2025/rh-gitlab-instance.md‎

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<!-- cSpell:ignore exfiltrated -->
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# Red Hat Consulting GitLab Instance Breach
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In October 2025, Red Hat confirmed a security breach affecting a self-hosted
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GitLab instance used internally by its Consulting division. The threat actor
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group calling themselves Crimson Collective claimed responsibility, asserting
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they had exfiltrated approximately 570 GB of compressed data from 28,000 private
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repositories, including around 800 Customer Engagement Reports (CERs). These
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CERs often contain sensitive customer architecture diagrams, configuration files,
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authentication tokens, and infrastructure details.
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## Impact
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Attackers claim to have accessed a significant volume of sensitive consulting
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and customer data.Stolen CERs may reveal network topologies, access credentials,
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and deployment configurations for major enterprise clients. That kind of
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information could be leveraged for secondary intrusions or social engineering.
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While Red Hat has not confirmed any misuse of the stolen data, the incident
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highlights the inherent risk of third-party data exposure within vendor
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ecosystems. Red Hat emphasized that no personal data or software supply chain
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assets have been confirmed compromised at this stage.
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## Type of Compromise
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This is a _Publishing Infrastructure_ type of compromise as the compromise
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occurred within Red Hat’s internal GitLab environment, which is part of its
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development and collaboration infrastructure.
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## References
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- [Security update: Incident related to Red Hat Consulting GitLab instance](https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/security-update-incident-related-red-hat-consulting-gitlab-instance)
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- [Red Hat confirms security incident after hackers breach GitLab instance](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/red-hat-confirms-security-incident-after-hackers-breach-gitlab-instance)
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- [Red Hat GitLab Data Breach: The Crimson Collective's Attack](https://blog.gitguardian.com/red-hat-gitlab-breach-the-crimson-collectives-attack/)

‎community/catalog/compromises/README.md‎

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many examples of different kinds of attack, so that we can better understand the
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patterns and develop best practices and tools.
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For definitions of each compromise type, please check out our [compromise definitions page](community/catalog/compromises/compromise-definitions.md)
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For definitions of each compromise type, please check out our [compromise definitions page](compromise-definitions.md)
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We welcome additions to this catalog by [filing an
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issue](https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/issues/new/choose) or [github pull
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<!-- cSpell:disable -->
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| Name | Year | Type of compromise | Link |
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| ----------------- | ------------------ | ------------------ | ----------- |
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| [Oracle Cloud SSO and Identity Infrastructure Compromise](2025/oracle-cloud.md) | 2025 | Publishing Infrastructure | [1](https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/the-biggest-supply-chain-hack-of-2025-6m-records-for-sale-exfiltrated-from-oracle-cloud-affecting-over-140k-tenants) |
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| [Widespread npm Ecosystem Supply Chain Attack](2025/npm-ecosystem.md) | 2025 | Malicious Maintainer | [1](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/cloud-security/npm-supply-chain-attack/) |
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| [Red Hat Consulting GitLab Instance Breach](2025/rh-gitlab-instance.md) | 2025 | Publishing Infrastructure | [1](https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/security-update-incident-related-red-hat-consulting-gitlab-instance) |
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| [The Nx s1ngularity Attack Leading to Credentials Leak](2025/nx-platform.md) | 2025 | Attack Chaining | [1](https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/nx-build-s1ngularity-supply-chain-attack/54223/) |
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| [The GhostAction Github Workflow Injection](2025/ghost-action.md) | 2025 | Publishing Infrastructure | [1](https://blog.gitguardian.com/ghostaction-campaign-3-325-secrets-stolen/) |
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| [tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromise](2025/changed-files.md) | 2025 | Attack Chaining | [1](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrrh-fwg8-r2c3/) |
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| [Solana Web3.js Code Injection](2024/solana_web3js.md) | 2024 | Social Engineering/Phishing Attack | [1](https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/malware-found-in-solana-npm-library-with-50m-downloads) [2](https://x.com/0xMert_/status/1864069157257613719) |
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| [Polyfill.io Infrastructure Takeover Leading to Malware Distribution](2024/polyfill.md) | 2024 | Publishing Infrastructure | [1](https://sansec.io/research/polyfill-supply-chain-attack) |
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| [Malware Disguised as Installer used to target Korean Public Institution](2024/targeted-signed-endoor.md) | 2024 | Trust and Signing | [1](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/63396/) |
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| [NPM reverse shells and data mining](2020/nodejs.md) | 2020 | Dev Tooling | [1](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/npm-nukes-nodejs-malware-opening-windows-linux-reverse-shells/) |
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| [Binaries of the CLI for `monero` compromised](2019/monero.md) | 2019 | Publishing Infrastructure | [1](https://web.getmonero.org/2019/11/19/warning-compromised-binaries.html), [2](https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/6151), [3](https://web.archive.org/web/20230630012925/https://old.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/dyfozs/security_warning_cli_binaries_available_on/) |
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| [Webmin backdoor](2019/webmin-backdoor.md) | 2019 | Dev Tooling | [1](https://www.zdnet.com/article/backdoor-found-in-webmin-a-popular-web-based-utility-for-managing-unix-servers/), [2](http://www.webmin.com/exploit.html) |
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| [purescript-npm](2019/purescript-npm.md) | 2019 | Source Code | [1](https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/1082) and [2](https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/1082) |
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| [purescript-npm](2019/purescript-npm.md) | 2019 | Source Code | [1](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jxf5-7x3j-8j9m) |
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| [electron-native-notify](2019/electron-native-notify.md) | 2019 | Source Code | [1](https://blog.npmjs.org/post/185397814280/plot-to-steal-cryptocurrency-foiled-by-the-npm), [2](https://komodoplatform.com/update-agama-vulnerability/)|
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| [PyPI typosquatting](2019/pypi.md) | 2019 | Negligence | [1](https://blog.reversinglabs.com/blog/suppy-chain-malware-detecting-malware-in-package-manager-repositories) |
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| [ROS build farm compromise](2019/ros.md) | 2019 | Trust and Signing <br>Publishing Infrastructure</br> | [1](https://discourse.ros.org/t/security-issue-on-ros-build-farm/9342/8), [2](https://discourse.ros.org/t/new-gpg-keys-deployed-for-packages-ros-org/9454) |
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| [HandBrake](2017/handbrake.md) | 2017 | Publishing Infrastructure | [1](https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/mac-threat-analysis/2017/05/handbrake-hacked-to-drop-new-variant-of-proton-malware/) |
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| [Kingslayer](2017/kingslayer.md) | 2017 | Publishing Infrastructure | [1](https://comsecglobal.com/kingslayer-a-supply-chain-attack/) |
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| [HackTask](2017/hacktask.md) | 2017 | Negligence | [1](https://securityintelligence.com/news/typosquatting-attack-puts-developers-at-risk-from-infected-javascript-packages/) |
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| [NotPetya](2017/notpetya.md) | 2017 | Attack Chaining | [1](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/04/analysis-of-telebots-cunning-backdoor/) |
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| [Bitcoin Gold](2017/bitcoingold.md) | 2017 | Source Code | [1](https://bitcoingold.org/critical-warning-nov-26/) |
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| [NotPetya](2017/notpetya.md) | 2017 | Attack Chaining | [1](https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/) |
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| [Bitcoin Gold](2017/bitcoingold.md) | 2017 | Source Code | [1](https://www.investopedia.com/news/bitcoin-gold-hack-shows-51-attack-real/) |
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| [ExpensiveWall](2017/expensivewall.md) | 2017 | Dev Tooling | [1](https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/09/14/expensivewall-dangerous-packed-malware-google-play-will-hit-wallet/), [2](https://research.checkpoint.com/expensivewall-dangerous-packed-malware-google-play-will-hit-wallet/) |
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| [OSX Elmedia player](2017/elmedia.md) | 2017 | Publishing infrastructure | [1](https://www.hackread.com/hackers-infect-mac-users-proton-malware-using-elmedia-player/) |
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| [GitHub password recovery issues](2016/gh-unicode.md) | 2016 | Dev Tool <br> Source Code </br> | [1](https://bounty.github.com/researchers/jagracey.html), [2](https://dev.to/jagracey/hacking-github-s-auth-with-unicode-s-turkish-dotless-i-460n) |
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| [WordPress backdoor](2007/wordpress.md) | 2007 | Source Code <br> Publishing Infrastructure </br> | [1](https://lwn.net/Articles/224997/) |
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| [SquirrelMail backdoor](2007/squirrelmail.md) | 2007 | Source Code <br> Publishing Infrastructure | [1](https://lwn.net/Articles/262688/) |
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| [Linux Kernel CVS Repository Hack](2003/kernel-repository.md) | 2003 | Source Code <br> Dev Tooling | [1](https://lwn.net/Articles/57135/) |
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| [gentoo rsync compromise](2003/gentoo-rsync.md) | 2003 | Publishing Infrastructure | [1](https://archives.gentoo.org/gentoo-announce/message/7b0581416ddd91522c14513cb789f17a) |
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| [gentoo rsync compromise](2003/gentoo-rsync.md) | 2003 | Publishing Infrastructure | [1](https://www.zdnet.com/article/gentoo-linux-server-compromised/) |
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| [Debian infra compromise](2003/debian.md) | 2003 | Publishing infrastructure | [1](https://www.debian.org/News/2003/20031202) |
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| [Unix Support Group login backdoor](1975/login-bell.md) | 1975 | Dev Tooling | [1](https://niconiconi.neocities.org/posts/ken-thompson-really-did-launch-his-trusting-trust-trojan-attack-in-real-life/) |

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