Fix docs #594

Akkii4 · 2023-06-13T20:07:48Z

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This commit updates the import paths in the liquidity-providing smart contract to use the contracts provided by the Uniswap V3 periphery package. This also fixes the compile issue.

vercel · 2023-06-13T20:07:52Z

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aravind33b · 2025-09-04T20:21:48Z

docs/concepts/research.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Authors: Guillermo Angeris, Hsien-Tang Kao, Rei Chiang, Charlie Noyes, Tarun Chi

 Authors: Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra

-> Automated market makers, first popularized by Hanson's logarithmic market scoring rule (or LMSR) for prediction markets, have become important building blocks, called 'primitives,' for decentralized finance. A particularly useful primitive is the ability to measure the price of an asset, a problem often known as the pricing oracle problem. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of a very large class of automated market makers, called constant function market makers (or CFMMs) which includes existing popular market makers such as Uniswap, Balancer, and Curve, whose yearly transaction volume totals to billions of dollars. We give sufficient conditions such that, under fairly general assumptions, agents who interact with these constant function market makers are incentivized to correctly report the price of an asset and that they can do so in a computationally efficient way. We also derive several other useful properties that were previously not known. These include lower bounds on the total value of assets held by CFMMs and lower bounds guaranteeing that no agent can, by any set of trades, drain the reserves of assets held by a given CFMM.
+> Automated market makers, first popularized by Hanson's logarithmic market scoring rule (or LMSR) for prediction markets, have become important building blocks, called 'primitives,' for decentralized finance. A particularly useful primitive is the ability to measure the price of an asset, a problem often known as the pricing oracle problem. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of a very large class of automated market makers, called constant function market makers (or CFMMs) which includes existing popular market makers such as Uniswap, Balancer, and Curve, whose yearly transaction volume totals to billions of dollars. We give sufficient conditions such that, under fairly general assumptions, agents who interact with these constant function market makers are incentivize to correctly report the price of an asset and that they can do so in a computationally efficient way. We also derive several other useful properties that were previously not known. These include lower bounds on the total value of assets held by CFMMs and lower bounds guaranteeing that no agent can, by any set of trades, drain the reserves of assets held by a given CFMM.


The existing one looks correct as it is supposed to be "incentivized" and not "incentivize"

aravind33b · 2025-09-04T20:21:52Z

docs/contracts/universal-router/01-overview.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ title: Overview
 sidebar_position: 1
 ---

-The `UniversalRouter` is an ETH, ERC20, and NFT swap router, that can aggregate trades across protocols to give users access highly-flexible and personalised transactions. The contract is unowned, and is not upgradeable.
+The `UniversalRouter` is an ETH, ERC20, and NFT swap router, that can aggregate trades across protocols to give users access highly-flexible and personalized transactions. The contract is unowned, and is not upgradeable.


The spelling is correct

aravind33b · 2025-09-04T20:22:35Z

docs/contracts/v2/concepts/01-protocol-overview/02-ecosystem-participants.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ title: Ecosystem Participants

 ![](./images/participants.jpg)

-The Uniswap ecosystem is primarily comprised of three types of users: liquidity providers, traders, and developers. Liquidity providers are incentivized to contribute [ERC-20](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20) tokens to common liquidity pools. Traders can swap these tokens for one another for a fixed [0.30% fee](../advanced-topics/fees) (which goes to liquidity providers). Developers can integrate directly with Uniswap smart contracts to power new and exciting interactions with tokens, trading interfaces, retail experiences, and more.
+The Uniswap ecosystem is primarily comprised of three types of users: liquidity providers, traders, and developers. Liquidity providers are incentivize to contribute [ERC-20](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20) tokens to common liquidity pools. Traders can swap these tokens for one another for a fixed [0.30% fee](../advanced-topics/fees) (which goes to liquidity providers). Developers can integrate directly with Uniswap smart contracts to power new and exciting interactions with tokens, trading interfaces, retail experiences, and more.


The existing one looks correct as it is supposed to be "incentivized" and not "incentivize"

aravind33b · 2025-09-04T20:22:46Z

docs/contracts/v2/concepts/02-core-concepts/02-pools.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ title: Pools

 # Introduction

-Each Uniswap liquidity pool is a trading venue for a pair of ERC20 tokens. When a pool contract is created, its balances of each token are 0; in order for the pool to begin facilitating trades, someone must seed it with an initial deposit of each token. This first liquidity provider is the one who sets the initial price of the pool. They are incentivized to deposit an equal _value_ of both tokens into the pool. To see why, consider the case where the first liquidity provider deposits tokens at a ratio different from the current market rate. This immediately creates a profitable arbitrage opportunity, which is likely to be taken by an external party.
+Each Uniswap liquidity pool is a trading venue for a pair of ERC20 tokens. When a pool contract is created, its balances of each token are 0; in order for the pool to begin facilitating trades, someone must seed it with an initial deposit of each token. This first liquidity provider is the one who sets the initial price of the pool. They are incentivize to deposit an equal _value_ of both tokens into the pool. To see why, consider the case where the first liquidity provider deposits tokens at a ratio different from the current market rate. This immediately creates a profitable arbitrage opportunity, which is likely to be taken by an external party.


The existing one looks correct as it is supposed to be "incentivized" and not "incentivize"

aravind33b · 2025-09-04T20:22:53Z

docs/contracts/v2/concepts/03-advanced-topics/03-understanding-returns.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: understanding-returns
 title: Understanding Returns
 ---

-Uniswap incentivizes users to add liquidity to trading pools by rewarding providers with the fees generated when other users trade with those pools. Market making, in general, is a complex activity. There is a risk of losing money during large and sustained movement in the underlying asset price compared to simply holding an asset.
+Uniswap incentivize users to add liquidity to trading pools by rewarding providers with the fees generated when other users trade with those pools. Market making, in general, is a complex activity. There is a risk of losing money during large and sustained movement in the underlying asset price compared to simply holding an asset.


The existing one looks correct as it is supposed to be "incentivized" and not "incentivize"

aravind33b · 2025-09-04T20:23:07Z

docs/contracts/v2/concepts/03-advanced-topics/06-research.md

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Authors: Guillermo Angeris, Hsien-Tang Kao, Rei Chiang, Charlie Noyes, Tarun Chi

 Authors: Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra

-> Automated market makers, first popularized by Hanson's logarithmic market scoring rule (or LMSR) for prediction markets, have become important building blocks, called 'primitives,' for decentralized finance. A particularly useful primitive is the ability to measure the price of an asset, a problem often known as the pricing oracle problem. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of a very large class of automated market makers, called constant function market makers (or CFMMs) which includes existing popular market makers such as Uniswap, Balancer, and Curve, whose yearly transaction volume totals to billions of dollars. We give sufficient conditions such that, under fairly general assumptions, agents who interact with these constant function market makers are incentivized to correctly report the price of an asset and that they can do so in a computationally efficient way. We also derive several other useful properties that were previously not known. These include lower bounds on the total value of assets held by CFMMs and lower bounds guaranteeing that no agent can, by any set of trades, drain the reserves of assets held by a given CFMM.
+> Automated market makers, first popularized by Hanson's logarithmic market scoring rule (or LMSR) for prediction markets, have become important building blocks, called 'primitives,' for decentralized finance. A particularly useful primitive is the ability to measure the price of an asset, a problem often known as the pricing oracle problem. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of a very large class of automated market makers, called constant function market makers (or CFMMs) which includes existing popular market makers such as Uniswap, Balancer, and Curve, whose yearly transaction volume totals to billions of dollars. We give sufficient conditions such that, under fairly general assumptions, agents who interact with these constant function market makers are incentivize to correctly report the price of an asset and that they can do so in a computationally efficient way. We also derive several other useful properties that were previously not known. These include lower bounds on the total value of assets held by CFMMs and lower bounds guaranteeing that no agent can, by any set of trades, drain the reserves of assets held by a given CFMM.


The existing one looks correct as it is supposed to be "incentivized" and not "incentivize"

aravind33b · 2025-09-04T20:23:25Z

docs/contracts/v3/guides/liquidity-mining/overview.md

 2. All NFTs must be unstaked: A program can conclude only when every NFT which participated in it is unstaked. To ensure this is always possible, after the `endTime` of a program _anyone_ may unstake _any_ NFT (though of course they may not claim outstanding `rewardToken`s due to the NFT owner). This ensures that even if all users do not unstake themselves, someone can unstake them manually so that the program can end.

-It's important that most or all programs fully conclude, primarily so that the `refundee` can reclaim any unallocated rewards. What are the conditions under which unallocated rewards will remain? Well, recall that the reward rate is the same across _all_ in-range liquidity. However, only program participants may actually claim accrued tokens, so it's likely that all programs will end up with a balance of `rewardToken`s that cannot be claimed. So, `refundee`s will typically be incentivized to bring programs to an official conclusion. This slightly cumbersome design is a consequence of the difficulty of consistently allocating rewards proportional to Uniswap V3 liquidity.
+It's important that most or all programs fully conclude, primarily so that the `refundee` can reclaim any unallocated rewards. What are the conditions under which unallocated rewards will remain? Well, recall that the reward rate is the same across _all_ in-range liquidity. However, only program participants may actually claim accrued tokens, so it's likely that all programs will end up with a balance of `rewardToken`s that cannot be claimed. So, `refundee`s will typically be incentivize to bring programs to an official conclusion. This slightly cumbersome design is a consequence of the difficulty of consistently allocating rewards proportional to Uniswap V3 liquidity.


It should be incentivized as it is now.

aravind33b · 2025-09-04T20:28:00Z

docs/contracts/v3/guides/local-environment.mdx

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ In the following sections, we’ll walk through the steps to create the same env

 ## Set Up Dependencies

-Node is one of the most common Javascript runtimes. For our purposes it will provide scripting we can use to compile and test our contracts. If you haven’t already, install NodeJS and its package manager NPM ([instructions](https://docs.npmjs.com/downloading-and-installing-node-js-and-npm)). Once those dependencies are set up, we can initialize our project: 
+Node is one of the most common Javascript runtime. For our purposes it will provide scripting we can use to compile and test our contracts. If you haven’t already, install NodeJS and its package manager NPM ([instructions](https://docs.npmjs.com/downloading-and-installing-node-js-and-npm)). Once those dependencies are set up, we can initialize our project: 


The existing phrase is correct grammatically.

Akkii4 added 8 commits May 19, 2023 19:40

Update import paths to use Uniswap V3 contracts

10896b2

This commit updates the import paths in the liquidity-providing smart contract to use the contracts provided by the Uniswap V3 periphery package. This also fixes the compile issue.

Update import paths in examples contracts

bff99fa

fixed typos

ea5572d

multiple typos fixed

8a6c8a7

fixed typo

a552d2d

updated correct variable type in comment

cf79c88

removed unnecessary contract imports

841990a

followed Check Effects Interactions pattern

5540c3f

Merge branch 'main' into fix-docs

19bf638

aravind33b reviewed Sep 4, 2025

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