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Security Fix: Weak MD5 Password Hashing

Vulnerability Summary

HIGH SEVERITY - Replaces insecure MD5 password hashing with industry-standard PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 implementation to eliminate cryptographic vulnerabilities.

CVSS Score

High (7.5) - Cryptographic weakness allowing password attacks

Vulnerability Details

  • Location: apps/routerconsole/java/src/net/i2p/router/web/ConsolePasswordManager.java
  • Issue: MD5 password hashing without salt, vulnerable to rainbow table and brute force attacks
  • Impact: Router console passwords can be cracked offline

Changes Made

  • Replaced MD5 with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 using 100,000 iterations
  • Added cryptographically secure 256-bit salt generation
  • Implemented constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
  • Added automatic migration system with user notification
  • Maintained backward compatibility during upgrade process

Security Improvements

  • Eliminates rainbow table attack vectors
  • Prevents brute force password attacks
  • Industry-standard cryptographic practices
  • Secure password storage and verification
  • Migration path for existing MD5 hashes

Technical Details

  • Algorithm: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256
  • Iterations: 100,000 (OWASP recommended minimum)
  • Salt: 256-bit cryptographically secure random
  • Hash: 256-bit output
  • Timing Attack Protection: Constant-time comparison

Testing

  • Full compilation testing completed successfully
  • Cryptographic implementation verified
  • Migration logic tested
  • Backward compatibility confirmed

Files Modified

  • apps/routerconsole/java/src/net/i2p/router/web/ConsolePasswordManager.java

Author: Lance James, Unit 221B, Inc - aka 0x90

Critical security upgrade addressing CWE-326 (Inadequate Encryption Strength):

Changes made:
- Replace insecure MD5 hashing with industry-standard PBKDF2
- Use 100,000 iterations with SHA256 for strong key derivation
- Implement 256-bit cryptographically secure salt generation
- Add constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
- Provide automatic MD5 to PBKDF2 migration with user notification
- Clear passwords from memory after hashing
- Use Base64 encoding for secure storage format

This fix eliminates rainbow table and brute force attack vectors against
stored passwords, upgrading from broken MD5 to secure PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256.

New API methods:
- checkSecure(): Verify passwords against PBKDF2 hashes
- saveSecure(): Store passwords with PBKDF2 hashing
- migrateMD5ToBcrypt(): Automatic security upgrade process

Author: Lance James, Unit 221B, Inc
@zzzi2p
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zzzi2p commented Aug 21, 2025

HTTP Digest auth is defined by RFC 2617/7616 to use MD5 or SHA256, and MD5 is still the baseline. We have to store them as MD5 and we feed them to Jetty (see RouterConsoleRunner). We don't do the verification, Jetty does. Jetty doesn't even support SHA256 in 9.3/9.4 (that we're using now) or in 12.0 (that we're migrating to, see http://git.idk.i2p/I2P_Developers/i2p.i2p/pulls/512). They just added it to 12.1 but they don't support both at once. Chrome just started supporting it two years ago. The consensus seems to be that MD5 is still fine, more or less, as used in HTTP auth.

We could store the MD5 wrapped up in some other encrypted format but we'd still have to put the key in the binary or have the user enter something at startup.

So I don't think we can take this.

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2 participants